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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS  
AT MURFREESBORO 
 
DAVID WILLIAMS ) Docket No.: 2015-05-0235 
Employee, )  
v. ) State File Number: 75284-2014 
NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. )  
Employer, ) Judge Dale Tipps 
And )  
SAFETY NAT. CAS. CORP. )  
Insurance Carrier. )  
 
  
 
COMPENSATION HEARING ORDER 
 
  
This matter came before the undersigned Workers’ Compensation Judge on July 6, 
2016, for a Compensation Hearing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-
239 (2015).  The central legal issues are: (1) whether the conditions for which the 
employee, David Williams, seeks benefits arose primarily out of and in the course and 
scope of his employment with the employer, Nissan North America, Inc,; (2) whether Mr. 
Williams is entitled to temporary disability benefits, and if so, in what amount; (3) 
whether Mr. Williams is entitled to permanent disability benefits; (4) whether Mr. 
Williams is entitled to past or future medical benefits; and (5) whether Mr. Williams’ left 
elbow injury claim is barred for failure to provide adequate statutory notice.
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  For the 
reasons set forth below, this Court finds that Mr. Williams established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he provided adequate notice and that he sustained a 
left elbow injury primarily arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment 
with Nissan.   Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Williams is entitled to medical 
benefits, temporary total disability benefits, and permanent partial disability benefits. 
 
History of Claim 
 
 Mr. Williams is a forty-nine-year-old resident of Rutherford County, Tennessee.  
                                                 
1
 A complete listing of the technical record and exhibits admitted at the Compensation Hearing is attached to this 
Order as an appendix. 
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He testified he has worked for Nissan for approximately fifteen years.  For approximately 
eight years prior to his work injury, he worked in the paint prep booth. 
 
 Mr. Williams described his work in considerable detail.  The paint prep booth had 
six different job stations, and each employee in the booth would perform a four-job 
rotation every workday.  The work involved inspection and preparation of automobile 
bodies for painting.  Although the specific duties varied with each station, Mr. Williams 
was required to check for defects in the metal by sight and by feel.  When defects were 
located, Mr. Williams would rub them out manually with a sanding screen or sand them 
off with one of several power sanders.  The line typically ran 400 to 440 vehicles per 
shift, so Mr. Williams performed this procedure approximately every forty to forty-five 
seconds. 
 
 On June 13, 2014, Mr. Williams was involved in a work accident that resulted in 
injuries to his shoulder.  Nissan accepted the claim as compensable and provided medical 
treatment with Dr. Jeffrey Hazlewood, the authorized treating physician (ATP).  The 
Bureau approved a settlement in that claim on January 13, 2016.  (Ex. 10.)  Following his 
return to work after the shoulder injury, Mr. Williams began developing tingling and 
numbness from his left elbow to his ring finger and small finger.  He reported the 
problem to the nurse practitioner in the onsite medical clinic, who examined him and 
performed some type of motion tests.  Mr. Williams contended he did not feel he had 
access to any further authorized treatment for his left elbow after that visit.   
 
Mr. Williams subsequently developed similar symptoms in his right elbow, as well 
as locking and pain in his right shoulder.  He reported these problems to his supervisor on 
September 18, 2014.  Nissan provided a panel of physicians, from which he selected Dr. 
Hazlewood.  (Ex. 7.) 
 
Dr. Hazlewood, who was still treating Mr. Williams’ left shoulder condition, saw 
him on October 1, 2014, for complaints of right elbow and shoulder pain.  Mr. Williams 
reported a gradual onset of pain that he attributed to repetitive pushing, pulling, and 
lifting on the job.  He denied any other events or contributing activities.  Dr. Hazlewood 
examined Mr. Williams and performed some physical tests.  He noted full rotation of the 
shoulder with pain, some crepitus, and a positive Neer’s impingement sign.  He found 
full range of motion in the elbow with no swelling.  (Ex. 2 to Dr. Hazelwood’s 
deposition.) 
 
Dr. Hazlewood’s impression was: 
 
Generalized right shoulder girdle pain and right lateral elbow pain.  I don’t 
really get a lateral epicondylitis on exam, but just some tenderness around 
the elbow itself without swelling.  I don’t find any evidence of ligament or 
tendon rupture.  The shoulder seems to be more of a generalized rotator 
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cuff tendinitis type syndrome and possibly impingement.  I do not find any 
suggestion of rotator cuff tear. 
 
Id.  When asked to address causation, Dr. Hazlewood further stated: 
 
I just don’t see how this is a “true work related event,” and certainly there is 
no structural anatomical injury from “a harmful event at work,” in my 
opinion. . . . I can’t call it a repetitive overuse type phenomenon given the 
fact he has been working the same job he has worked for quite awhile, and 
he never had any problems before.  One can call this a compensation effect, 
but per the research literature a compensation effect does not cause a work 
compensable injury/structural injury.  Also, I don’t think there is a 
structural injury here as much as just either idiopathic shoulder pain and 
elbow pain vs. soreness in the muscles from using his arm more on the 
right. . . . I cannot state this is a work related injury, especially with the new 
laws that have come out July 1
st
. 
 
Id. 
 
 Dr. Hazlewood reiterated his right-arm causation opinion and analysis in his 
deposition testimony, and confirmed he never examined, treated, or discussed Mr. 
Williams’ left elbow with him.  (Ex. 2 at 10-13.)  On cross-examination he characterized 
Mr. Williams’ condition as idiopathic because he could not identify any cause of the 
shoulder and elbow complaints.  Id. at 24-29.  He also confirmed he did no diagnostic 
studies of the elbow or shoulder, and acknowledged those could be useful in determining 
the presence of a structural injury.  Id. at 31-32. 
 
 Based on Dr. Hazlewood’s opinion, Nissan denied Mr. Williams’ claim on 
October 10, 2014, on the grounds that his condition was not primarily work related.  (Ex. 
9.)  Mr. Williams sought medical treatment on his own with Dr. Roderick Vaughan, 
whom he saw for the first time on October 20, 2014.  Dr. Vaughan examined Mr. 
Williams and ordered MRIs of the right elbow and shoulder, as well as a nerve 
conduction study.  After reviewing the films and test results, Dr. Vaughan diagnosed 
right rotator cuff syndrome, right lateral epicondylitis/tendinopathy, and right cubital 
tunnel syndrome.  (Ex. 3 at 28.)  He performed surgical epicondylar debridement, 
extensor tendon repair, and ulnar nerve decompression transposition on December 11, 
2014.  Id. at 37. 
 
 On December 29, 2014, Mr. Williams complained to Dr. Vaughan of left shoulder 
and elbow pain and numbness in his left ring finger and small finger.  He reported these 
symptoms began approximately one month prior to his right arm and shoulder problem.  
After an EMG and MRI, Dr. Vaughan assessed left ulnar neuropathy.  Id. at 41, 60.  He 
performed a left ulnar decompression and transposition on March 3, 2015.  Id. at 95. 
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 In his deposition, Dr. Vaughan was asked whether Mr. Williams’ right cubital 
tunnel injury primarily arose as a result of his repetitive work injuries.  He responded: 
 
Mr. Williams had relayed to me that he performed repetitive gripping at 
work and used pneumatic tools, which could cause vibration.  He also 
indicated that he worked in an outstretched manner and that his hands were 
used relatively close to the torso with the elbow in flexion.  Mr. Williams 
had no other significant contributing factors such as a history of blunt 
trauma to the ulnar nerve or history of diabetes, which can contribute to 
neuropathy.  In turn, I estimated that it was probable that his cubital tunnel 
syndrome on both the right and left upper extremities were related to his 
repetitive work activities. 
 
(Ex. 1 at 17-18.) 
 
 When asked whether Mr. Williams’ right shoulder injury arose primarily out of his 
work activities, Dr. Vaughan testified: 
 
His MRI demonstrated mild biceps tendinitis and there was a questionable 
tear of the superior labrum, mild tendinosis of the cuff was also noted.  No 
cuff tear was seen.  I thought that it was probable that his findings were 
degenerative and the repetitive work activity could exacerbate that 
underlying condition but was not the majority causation of it. . . . I’m of the 
opinion that it would be more than 50 percent probable that [the work 
activities] would exacerbate the underlying condition. 
 
Id. at 18-19.  Dr. Vaughan also opined it was more probable than not that the right cubital 
tunnel surgery was reasonable and medically necessary to treat Mr. William’s work-
related condition.  Id.   
 
Regarding Mr. Williams’ left arm, Dr. Vaughan testified that the cubital tunnel 
conditions primarily arose out of his repetitive work activities.  Id.  He went on to assign 
whole body impairments of two percent for the left elbow and five percent for the right 
elbow.  He assigned no impairment to the right shoulder.  Id. at 20-21. 
 
Following Mr. Williams’ recovery from surgery, he returned to work at Nissan, 
where he now works in a different department. 
 
 Mr. Williams filed a Petition for Benefit Determination (PBD) on August 4, 2015, 
seeking temporary and permanent disability and medical benefits.  The parties did not 
resolve the disputed issues through mediation, and the Mediating Specialist filed a post-
discovery Dispute Certification Notice (DCN) on June 15, 2016. 
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 At the Compensation Hearing, Mr. Williams asserted he is entitled to medical 
treatment, temporary disability benefits, and permanent disability benefits for injuries to 
his right shoulder, right elbow, and left elbow arising primarily out of and in the course 
and scope of his employment.  He contended he has rebutted the statutory presumption of 
correctness attached to the right shoulder/elbow causation opinions of Dr. Hazlewood.  
Specifically, he argued that Dr. Hazlewood’s causation opinions in this case are 
inconsistent.  He also asserted Dr. Hazlewood is biased in favor of workers’ 
compensation carriers and employers.  He further contended Dr. Hazlewood’s opinion is 
unsound because he only saw Mr. Williams on one occasion and failed to order or 
consider any diagnostic studies in reaching his conclusions.   
 
Mr. Williams contended Dr. Vaughan, on the other hand, is a board certified 
orthopedic surgeon who is better equipped to evaluate his injuries.  He was the treating 
physician who saw Mr. Williams many times over the course of several months.  Mr. 
Williams maintained Dr. Vaughan’s causation opinion, when taken in conjunction with 
the lay testimony, is sufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness statutorily 
afforded to Dr. Hazlewood.  
 
Nissan countered that Mr. Williams is not entitled to any additional workers’ 
compensation benefits for his left elbow because he failed to provide the statutorily-
required notice of the injury.  It further argued Mr. Williams has not met his burden of 
proving compensability because Dr. Vaughan’s opinion is insufficient to overcome the 
presumption that Dr. Hazlewood’s opinion is correct.  Nissan further asserted it has a 
statutory right to an offset against any medical and disability benefits. 
 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
 
The following legal principles govern this case.  Mr. Williams has the burden of 
proof on all essential elements of his claim.  Scott v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, No. 
2015-01-0055, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. 
App. Bd. Aug. 18, 2015).  “[A]t a compensation hearing where the injured employee has 
arrived at a trial on the merits, the employee must establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he or she is, in fact, entitled to the requested benefits.”  Willis v. All Staff, 
No. 2014-05-0005, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 42, at *18 (Tenn. Workers’ 
Comp. App. Bd. Nov. 9, 2015); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(6) (2015) 
(“[T]he employee shall bear the burden of proving each and every element of the claim 
by a preponderance of the evidence.”).  In analyzing whether Mr. Williams has met his 
burden, the Court will not construe the law remedially or liberally in his favor, but 
instead must construe the law fairly, impartially, and in accordance with basic principles 
of statutory construction favoring neither Mr. Williams nor Nissan.  See Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 50-6-116 (2015). 
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Compensability 
 
Mr. Williams’ burden includes proving his injury arose primarily out of and occur 
in the course and scope of the employment.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14) (2015).  To 
do so, he must show his injury was “caused by a specific incident, or set of incidents, 
arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, and is identifiable by 
time and place of occurrence.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(A) (2015).  Further, he 
must show, “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that it contributed more than 
fifty percent (50%) in causing the . . . disablement or need for medical treatment, 
considering all causes.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(C) (2015). 
 
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, the Court finds Mr. Williams 
has met his burden and is entitled to the requested benefits for his left elbow injury.  He 
testified he developed tingling and numbness from his left elbow to his ring finger and 
small finger, which he reported to the nurse practitioner in Nisan’s onsite medical clinic.  
This constitutes a specific set of incidents, identifiable by time and place of occurrence.  
Nissan submitted no proof to the contrary. 
 
Regarding Nissan’s notice defense, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-
201(a)(1) (2015), provides in pertinent part that:  
Every injured employee . . . shall, immediately upon the occurrence of an 
injury, or as soon thereafter as is reasonable and practicable, give or cause 
to be given to the employer who has no actual notice, written notice of the 
injury . . . unless it can be shown that the employer had actual knowledge of 
the accident.  (Emphasis added.) 
As noted above, Nissan failed to present any evidence rebutting Mr. Williams’ testimony 
that he told Nissan’s nurse practitioner about his left elbow problems.  The Court finds he 
has established Nissan’s actual knowledge of the injury and that this constitutes adequate 
legal notice. 
 
 The only medical evidence submitted regarding the cause of Mr. Williams’ left 
elbow condition was the opinion of Dr. Vaughan, who testified the cubital tunnel 
condition primarily arose out of Mr. Williams’ repetitive work activities.  As this opinion 
was unrebutted by any medical proof, the Court finds Mr. Williams has met his burden of 
proving “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that [his work] contributed more 
than fifty percent (50%) in causing the . . . disablement or need for medical treatment.” 
 
 Nissan argued that the Court should disregard Dr. Vaughan’s opinion because he 
failed to demonstrate an accurate understanding of Mr. William’s job duties.  While there 
are some discrepancies in Dr. Vaughan’s description of how much grasping and lifting 
Mr. Williams had to perform, the Court finds Mr. Williams’ description of his work 
duties is generally consistent with “repetitive work activities” in Dr. Vaughan’s 
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diagnosis.  Further, the Court notes that during Dr. Vaughan’s deposition, he did not 
change his causation opinion after Nissan’s attorney provided him with a moderately 
detailed description of Mr. Williams’ job duties. 
 
 Regarding Mr. Williams’ right elbow and shoulder claim, the Court finds he failed 
to meet his burden of establishing the necessary causal relationship between his work and 
his injuries.  Dr. Hazlewood testified that these conditions did not primarily arise out of 
and in the course and scope of employment.  Dr. Vaughan’s testimony was insufficient to 
overcome the statutory presumption of Dr. Hazlewood’s opinion established by 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(14)(E) (2015). 
 
 Although the parties disputed the relative weight of the medical testimony, the 
Court finds that, even in the absence of Dr. Hazlewood’s opinion, Dr. Vaughan’s opinion 
would fail to meet the statutory threshold necessary to establish causation.  As noted 
above, Mr. Williams bears the burden of proving, “to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty” that his injury “contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the . . . 
disablement or need for medical treatment, considering all causes.”  While Dr. Vaughan 
was asked whether Mr. Williams’ work was the primary cause of his injury, he only 
testified that the cubital tunnel syndrome was “related to his repetitive work activities.”  
Similarly, he noted the right shoulder condition was degenerative, but Mr. Williams’ 
work “exacerbate[d] the underlying condition.”  The essential problem with Dr. 
Vaughan’s opinion is that it only establishes Mr. Williams’ right arm and shoulder 
conditions are related to his work, not that the work primarily caused them.  In the 
absence of any other medical opinion, Mr. Williams cannot meet his burden of 
establishing the requisite medical causation, much less rebutting Dr. Hazlewood’s 
opinion by a preponderance of the evidence. 
 
Temporary Disability Benefits 
 
An injured worker is eligible for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits if: (1) 
the worker became disabled from working due to a compensable injury; (2) there is a 
causal connection between the injury and the inability to work; and (3) the worker 
established the duration of the period of disability.  Jones v. Crencor Leasing and Sales, 
No. 2015-06-0332, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 48, at *7 (Tenn. Workers’ 
Comp. App. Bd. Dec. 11, 2015) (citing Simpson v. Satterfield, 564 S.W.2d 953, 955 
(Tenn. 1978)).   
 
The parties stipulated that, in the event the Court determines the left elbow injury 
to be compensable, Mr. Williams is entitled to temporary total disability benefits from 
March 12, 2015, through June 24, 2015, a period of 105 days.  At the stipulated 
compensation rate of $835.00, this results in temporary total disability benefits of 
$12,525.00. 
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Permanent Disability Benefits 
 
 For post-July 1, 2014 injuries, permanent partial disability is paid at sixty-six and 
two-thirds percent of the injured employee’s average weekly wage for the period of 
compensation as determined by multiplying the employee’s impairment rating by 450 
weeks.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(3)(A) (2015).  The only medical impairment rating 
assigned in this case is the two percent impairment given by Dr. Vaughan, giving Mr. 
Williams a period of compensation of nine weeks.  At his stipulated compensation rate, 
his “original award” is $7,515.00.  He is not entitled to any further disability benefits 
because he returned to work earning the same or greater wages. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 
50-6-207(3)(B) (2015). 
 
Disability Plan Setoff 
 
Nissan claims to be entitled to a setoff against any temporary or permanent 
disability benefits, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-114(b) (2015), 
which provides: 
 
Any employer may set off from temporary total, temporary partial, 
permanent partial and permanent total disability benefits any payment made 
to an employee under an employer funded disability plan for the same 
injury; provided, that the disability plan permits such an offset.  The offset 
from a disability plan may not result in an employee’s receiving less than 
the employee would otherwise receive under this chapter.  In the event that 
a collective bargaining agreement is in effect, this subsection (b) shall be 
subject to the agreement of both parties. 
 
 The parties stipulated that a Nissan-funded disability plan paid Mr. Williams 
short-term and long-term disability benefits totaling $18,518.95 for the period of 
November 19, 2014, through June 24, 2015.  It further appears Nissan’s plans specifically 
allow for such a setoff.  However, the parties provided no detailed record of the disability 
payments or any indication of the totals paid to Mr. Williams from March 12, 2015, 
through June 24, 2015, the period of his recovery from the left elbow surgery.  As a 
result, the Court is left without any information showing the amount of the “payment 
made to [Mr. Williams] under an employer funded disability plan for the same injury.”  
Without any means of calculating the disability plan benefits attributable solely to the left 
arm injury, the Court must deny Nissan’s setoff request. 
 
Medical Expenses 
 
“[T]he employer or the employer’s agent shall furnish, free of charge to the 
employee, such medical and surgical treatment . . . made reasonably necessary by 
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accident[.]”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(1)(A) (2015).  Having found that Mr. 
Williams’ left arm injury constituted a compensable work injury, the Court finds Nissan 
is responsible for the costs associated with treating that condition.
2
  As Dr. Vaughan 
provided extensive treatment, including surgery, for left elbow condition, it is appropriate 
that he be designated the authorized treating physician for any future treatment. 
 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows: 
 
1. Medical care for Mr. Williams’ left elbow injuries shall be paid by Nissan or its 
workers’ compensation carrier, who shall continue to provide Mr. Williams with 
medical treatment for these injuries as required by Tennessee Code Annotated 
section 50-6-204 (2015).   Dr. Vaughan shall be designated the authorized treating 
physician for any future care.  Medical bills shall be furnished to Nissan or its 
workers’ compensation carrier by Mr. Williams or the medical providers. 
 
2. Nissan shall pay past due temporary total disability benefits of $12,525.00 for the 
period from March 12, 2015, through June 24, 2015. 
 
3. Nissan shall pay $7,515.00 in permanent partial disability benefits.  
 
4. Mr. Williams’ attorney is awarded an attorney’s fee of twenty percent of the total 
permanent and temporary disability benefits. 
 
5. Costs of this cause of $150.00 are assessed against Nissan pursuant to Tennessee 
Compilation Rules and Regulations 0800-02-21-.07 (2015), to be paid within five 
days of this order becoming final. 
 
6. Nissan shall prepare and file a statistical data form within ten business days of the 
date of this order, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-244 (2015). 
 
7. After a Compensation Hearing Order entered by a Workers’ Compensation Judge 
has become final in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-
239(c)(7) (2015), compliance with this Order must occur in accordance with 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(c)(9) (2015).  The Insurer or Self-
Insured Employer must submit confirmation of compliance with this Order to the 
Bureau by email to WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov no later than the fifth 
business day after this Order becomes final or all appeals are exhausted.  Failure to 
submit the necessary confirmation within the period of compliance may result in a 
                                                 
2 
The parties stipulated that a Nissan-funded health plan paid Mr. Williams’ medical bills.  Nissan contends this 
satisfies its statutory requirement of providing reasonable and necessary medical treatment.  If Nissan choses to pay 
medical treatment from its health plan, that would seem to constitute compliance with the statute and this order, but 
the Court declines to make any apportionment between Nissan’s health plan provider and its workers’ compensation 
carrier. 
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penalty assessment for non-compliance. 
 
ENTERED this the 13th day of July, 2016. 
 
 
_____________________________________  
     Dale Tipps 
Workers’ Compensation Judge 
 
 
Right to Appeal: 
 
Tennessee Law allows any party who disagrees with this Compensation Hearing 
Order to appeal the decision to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board or the 
Tennessee Supreme Court.  To appeal your case to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals 
Board, you must:  
 
1. Complete the enclosed form entitled: “Compensation Hearing Notice of Appeal.” 
 
2. File the completed form with the Court Clerk within thirty calendar days of the 
date the Workers’ Compensation Judge entered the Compensation Hearing Order. 
 
3. Serve a copy of the Compensation Hearing Notice of Appeal upon the opposing 
party.  
 
4. The appealing party is responsible for payment of a filing fee in the amount of 
$75.00.  Within ten calendar days after the filing of a notice of appeal, payment 
must be received by check, money order, or credit card payment.  Payments can be 
made in person at any Bureau office or by United States mail, hand-delivery, or 
other delivery service.  In the alternative, the appealing party may file an Affidavit 
of Indigency, on a form prescribed by the Bureau, seeking a waiver of the filing 
fee.  The Affidavit of Indigency may be filed contemporaneously with the Notice 
of Appeal or must be filed within ten calendar days thereafter.  The Appeals Board 
will consider the Affidavit of Indigency and issue an Order granting or denying 
the request for a waiver of the filing fee as soon thereafter as is 
practicable.  Failure to timely pay the filing fee or file the Affidavit of 
Indigency in accordance with this section shall result in dismissal of the 
appeal. 
 
5. The party filing the notice of appeal, having the responsibility of ensuring a 
complete record on appeal, may request, from the Court Clerk, the audio recording 
of the hearing for the purpose of having a transcript prepared by a licensed court 
reporter and filing it with the Court Clerk within fifteen calendar days of the filing 
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of the Compensation Hearing Notice of Appeal. Alternatively, the party filing the 
appeal may file a joint statement of the evidence within fifteen calendar days of 
the filing of the Compensation Hearing Notice of Appeal. The statement of the 
evidence must convey a complete and accurate account of what transpired in the 
Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims and must be approved by the workers’ 
compensation judge before the record is submitted to the Clerk of the Appeals 
Board.  See Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-22-.03 (2015). 
 
6. After the Workers’ Compensation Judge approves the record and the Court Clerk 
 transmits it to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, the appeal will be 
 docketed and assigned to an Appeals Board Judge for review. At that time, a 
 docketing notice shall be sent to the parties.  Thereafter, the parties have fifteen   
 calendar days to submit briefs to the Appeals Board for consideration.  See  Tenn. 
 Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-22-.02(3) (2015). 
 
To appeal your case directly to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the 
Compensation Order must be final and you must comply with the Tennessee Rules 
of Appellate Procedure.  If neither party timely files an appeal with the Appeals 
Board, this Order will become final by operation of law thirty calendar days after 
entry pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(c)(7).   
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APPENDIX 
 
Technical record: 
 
1. Petition for Benefit Determination 
2. Post-Discovery Dispute Certification Notice 
3. Joint Pre-Hearing Statement and Stipulations 
4. Employee’s Compensation Pre-Hearing Brief 
5. Employer’s Compensation Pre-Hearing Brief 
 
The Court did not consider attachments to Technical Record filings unless admitted into 
evidence during the Compensation Hearing.  The Court considered factual statements in 
these filings or any attachments to them as allegations unless established by the evidence. 
 
Exhibits: 
 
1. Deposition transcript of Dr. Roderick Vaughan 
2. Deposition transcript of Dr. Jeffrey Hazlewood 
3. Employee Medical Records Index 
4. First Report of Injury 
5. Wage Statement 
6. Employee/Manager Medical Statement 
7. C-42 Physician Panel 
8. Nissan Employee Benefits Manual (excerpts) 
9. C-23 Notice of Denial 
10. Settlement approval documents of January 13, 2016 
11. July 17, 2015 email from Marshall McClarnon to Howard Keltner (identification 
only) 
12. Affidavit of David Williams 
13. David Williams’ responses to Nissan’s written discovery requests 
14. Medical bills (identification only) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Compensation Hearing Order 
was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 13th 
day of July, 2016. 
 
 
Name Certified 
Mail 
Fax 
Number 
Via 
Email 
Email Address 
Marshall McClarnon, 
Esq. 
   X marshall@poncelaw.com 
Thomas Tucker, Esq.     X tomtucker@bellsouth.com 
 
______________________________________ 
              PENNY SHRUM, COURT CLERK 
       wc.courtclerk@tn.gov  
  
 
